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B. Introduction 
This document describes the technical security mechanisms currently in operation in XSEDE to support 
secure access to XSEDE resources. Currently, these mechanisms are all inherited from TeraGrid without 
modification for XSEDE. As XSEDE’s technical security mechanisms evolve, updated revisions of this 
document will be produced. 
 
Other topics such as security operations, security policies, security architecture, etc., are out of scope for 
this document. 
 
The primary audience of this document is XSEDE staff, so they have a basic familiarity with XSEDE’s 
current technical security mechanisms as they support/operate these mechanisms and design/develop 
modifications and improvements. 
C. Definitions 
This document makes use of the following acronyms and terms: 
 Account: An account is a record associated with a user of a service. Different types of accounts in 
XSEDE include User Portal accounts and Service Provider accounts. Each account has an associated 
username. For example, Jim Basney’s User Portal account has username “jbasney” while his TACC 
account has username “tg457137”. 
 Account Management Information Exchange (AMIE): AMIE is the system and protocol for 
exchanging accounting information among XSEDE systems. 
 Allocations: The allocations process assigns users to projects that have access to resources at the 
service providers. 
 Assertion: An assertion is a type of credential (for example: in SAML) that provides authentication 
information (identity or attributes) about an individual. 
 Authentication: Authentication is the process of establishing that individuals or systems are who or 
what they claim to be. 
 Authorization: Authorization is the process that determines what an individual or system can do. 
 Certificate: A certificate is a type of credential. XSEDE uses certificates as specified in RFC 5280. 
 Certificate Authority (CA): A CA is an entity that issues certificates that identify individuals or 
systems. 
 Credential: A credential is a digital object that conveys security information. Examples include 
assertions, certificates, tokens, and usernames/passwords. 
 Delegation: Delegation is the process of granting authorization to an individual or system to act on 
your behalf, with some of your rights/authorizations. 
 Distinguished Name (DN): A DN uniquely identifies an individual or system following the X.500 
standard. An example DN is “/C=US/O=National Center for Supercomputing Applications/CN=Jim 
Basney”. 
 Global Grid Forum (GGF): GGF is the old name for the Open Grid Forum (OGF). 
 International Grid Trust Federation (IGTF): The IGTF (www.igft.net) is an accreditation body for 
CAs. 
 Kerberos Principal: A Kerberos principal uniquely identifies an individual in the Kerberos database. 
An example Kerberos principal is “jbasney@TERAGRID.ORG”. 
 Open Grid Forum (OGF): The OGF (www.ogf.org) is a standards organization for distributed 
computing. 
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 Principal Investigator (PI): A PI requests allocations of XSEDE resources and determines who has 
access to a project’s allocation of XSEDE resources. 
 Proxy Certificate: An X.509 certificate that is derived from, and signed by, another X.509 certificate 
for the purpose of delegation. Defined by RFC 3820. 
 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): A PKI consists of CAs that issue certificates to participants and 
relying parties that validate those certificates. 
 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML): SAML is an XML-based OASIS standard for 
exchanging authentication and authorization data. Multiple SAML protocols, bindings, and profiles 
have been defined. XSEDE supports the SAML 2.0 Web Browser Single Sign-On protocol. 
 Single Sign-On (SSO): Single Sign-On allows a user to log in once and gain access to multiple 
systems without being prompted to log in again at each system. 
 Token: A token is a type of credential. XSEDE uses tokens as defined in RFC 5849 (The OAuth 1.0 
Protocol). 
 Username: A username uniquely identifies a person on a computer network. In XSEDE, a user’s 
Portal username (for example: “jbasney”) may differ from his or her username at specific XSEDE 
service providers (for example: “tg457137” at TACC). 
 X.509: X.509 is an ITU-T standard for public key infrastructure (PKI). XSEDE supports X.509 
certificates as specified in RFC 3820 and RFC 5280. 
 XSEDE Central Database (XCDB): The XCDB contains records for users on XSEDE allocations 
(but not “unvetted” users). The XCDB records user DNs, information about user accounts at service 
providers, and information about user project allocations and resource usage. 
D. User Portal Accounts 
Users and staff can obtain XSEDE User Portal accounts by following the “Create Account” link at 
https://www.xsede.org/ or https://portal.xsede.org/. The User Portal creates these accounts automatically, 
without any vetting by XSEDE staff; therefore, they are called “unvetted” accounts. The User Portal 
creates these accounts in the underlying TERAGRID.ORG Kerberos realm; therefore each User Portal 
account username (example: “jbasney”) has a corresponding Kerberos principal (example: 
“jbasney@TERAGRID.ORG”), and XSEDE services can validate User Portal account usernames and 
passwords via the Kerberos service. These “unvetted” accounts allow users to submit proposals for 
XSEDE allocations, post to XSEDE message boards, and access the XSEDE wiki (subject to wiki-
specific authorization mechanisms). However, these accounts do not provide access to MyProxy, the 
ticket system, or the login nodes at the Service Providers; access to these systems requires that users be on 
an active project allocation, via the allocations process, described below. 
E. Allocations 
XSEDE resources are allocated to researchers by peer review (research allocations), and/or review by 
XSEDE staff (startup and education allocations).
1
 Principal Investigators (PIs) submit proposals for 
resource allocations via the XSEDE User Portal.
2
 XSEDE staff review startup and education allocations 
to enable fast approval time. Requests for the larger research allocations are reviewed at quarterly XSEDE 
Resource Allocations Committee (XRAC) meetings. The XRAC consists of volunteers selected from the 
faculty and staff of U.S. universities, laboratories, and other research institutions. All members serve a 
term of 2–5 years and have expertise in computational science or engineering. Each proposal is assigned 
to two committee members for review. The committee members can also solicit an external review. After 
                                                     
1
 https://www.xsede.org/allocations 
2
 https://portal.xsede.org/ 
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several weeks of review, the entire committee convenes to discuss the relative merits of each proposal and 
award time based on availability of resources. To apply, the PI must be a researcher or educator at a U.S. 
academic or non-profit research institution. Proposals are judged on scientific merit, potential for 
progress, numerical approach, and justification for resources. Allocations are typically awarded for one 
year. PIs can submit renewal or supplemental proposals to the committee to extend their allocation. 
 
Each XSEDE user signs up for an XSEDE account via the XSEDE user portal, choosing a username and 
password. Project PIs use the portal’s Add User Form to add members to their projects. PIs can also use 
this form to remove project members. For users on multiple projects, each project PI must add the user 
separately to his or her project to request the user to have access to the project’s resources. All users are 
required to agree to the terms of the XSEDE User Responsibility Form
3
, which educates users about 
secure and appropriate computing practices, including a prohibition against sharing accounts. Users can 
change or reset their password via the portal. 
 
When a user is first added to an XSEDE project, the XSEDE Central Database assigns certificate subject 
distinguished names with a unique common name to the user. The common name includes the user’s first 
and last names, with an optionally appended serial number in case of name conflicts. The database 
management system ensures that distinguished names are uniquely assigned and are never re-assigned to 
a different user. 
F. Account Management 
The Account Management Information Exchange (AMIE) software system provides the capability for 
XSEDE to manage accounts and track resource usage. AMIE is based on the Global Grid Forum (GGF) 
Usage Records specification
4
 and is used by XSEDE to provide a distributed accounting mechanism 
across all of its sites so that an individual users usage can be tracked across multiple resources. AMIE is 
also responsible for propagating Distinguished Names across the XSEDE sites. 
G. Distinguished Names 
Distinguished Names (DNs) uniquely identify XSEDE users. Certificate Authorities (CAs) issue digitally 
signed certificates containing the DNs (in the subject field) to users. Users run programs that present the 
digitally signed certificates to online services as part of an authentication protocol, enabling the services 
to make authorization decisions based the users' authenticated distinguished names. DNs contain the 
user's name (in the common name field), together with other qualifying components that ensure the DN 
uniquely identifies the user even when other people may have the same name (such as John Wilson). For 
example: 
 
/C=US/O=National Center for Supercomputing Applications/CN=Jim Basney  
 
DNs enable users to have a consistent identity across all XSEDE sites, which may each have a different 
login name for the same user. This allows the user to be unaware of site-specific login names and enables 
                                                     
3
 https://www.xsede.org/usage-policies 
4
 http://www.ogf.org/documents/GFD.98.pdf 
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single sign-on, which is the ability to use the same credentials to authenticate to multiple XSEDE 
systems. 
H. Single Sign-On 
The user’s XSEDE username and password enables single sign-on access to all XSEDE resources. Users 
can use XSEDE single sign-on from the XSEDE 
User Portal and from the command-line (via 
XSEDE compatible client tools). Upon entering 
their username and password, users obtain a 
short-lived certificate (default lifetime: 12 hours, 
maximum lifetime: 11 days) from a MyProxy 
Certificate Authority (CA). Users use this 
certificate to authenticate to remote login, data 
transfer, batch job submission, and other services. 
Furthermore, researchers can delegate a proxy 
certificate to remote login sessions and batch 
jobs, allowing those sessions/jobs to access 
resources on their behalf. Error! Reference source 
not found. presents the XSEDE single sign-on 
system architecture.  
 
The XSEDE Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) consists of Certificate Authorities (CAs) operated by 
XSEDE member institutions and other partners.
5
 XSEDE service providers accept a consistent set of CAs 
to facilitate single sign-on across the XSEDE resources. The XSEDE Security Operations group reviews 
requests to add or remove CAs and operates by consensus across the XSEDE members. According to the 
policy
6
 of the working group, new CAs must be accredited by the International Grid Trust Federation 
(IGTF), the de facto standards body for defining levels of assurance for PKIs in production academic 
grids around the world. XSEDE runs a Kerberos domain to validate usernames and passwords. Kerberos 
is not exposed to end-users directly but is instead used by other services (such as the MyProxy CAs) as an 
authentication service. 
  
                                                     
5
 See http://security.teragrid.org/TG-CAs.html for the current list of CAs. 
6
 http://security.teragrid.org/docs/CertMgmtAuthPolicy.pdf 
Figure 1 - XSEDE single sign-on provides certificates for 
secure access to XSEDE services. 
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I. InCommon Federation 
To enable XSEDE users to use the authentication 
method of their home organization for access to 
XSEDE service providers, XSEDE participates in the 
InCommon Federation (see Figure 2) to provide a 
bridge from campus authentication to the existing 
XSEDE authentication architecture. XSEDE’s 
approach combines account linking and credential 
translation [1]. 
 
Figure 3 shows a conceptual overview of the credential 
translation processes. The translation at left between 
the campus domain and InCommon is handled by 
Shibboleth or a similar SAML identity provider. The 
translation at right between InCommon and the 
existing XSEDE single sign-on system uses an 
account linking process to bind SAML identities to 
existing XSEDE identities. 
A.1 InCommon: Account Linking 
The account linking process binds the user’s 
campus identity, conveyed via InCommon/SAML, 
to his or her XSEDE identity, as stored in the 
XSEDE Central Database. When the user visits 
the XSEDE federated login web site
7
, which 
implements a standard InCommon SAML service 
provider using the Shibboleth software
8
, he or she 
sees a prompt to select an InCommon identity 
provider (i.e., the researcher’s home campus) in 
order to initiate authentication. The Shibboleth 
software redirects the user’s web browser to the 
selected identity provider, where the user logs in. 
The identity provider then redirects the user’s web browser back to the XSEDE site with a SAML 
authentication assertion, according to the SAML protocols. At this point the account linking component is 
activated. It first searches the account-link database (actually a table in the existing user database) for an 
entry matching the researcher’s authenticated campus (SAML) identifier. If found, the entry identifies the 
XSEDE username linked to that campus identity, allowing the researcher’s XSEDE login to proceed. If 
no entry is found, the federated login site prompts the researcher for his or her Portal username and 
password. If the username and password verify (via the XSEDE Kerberos service), the federated login 
site creates a new entry in the account-link database linking the XSEDE account with the campus identity. 
Then the researcher’s XSEDE login can proceed with that Portal username. When the researcher returns 
to the site at a later time, the account-link entry will be in place, so the researcher will be able to log in 
using his or her campus identity without being prompted again for a Portal username and password. 
 
                                                     
7
 https://go.teragrid.org 
8
 http://www.shibboleth.net/ 
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Figure 2 - Federated login to XSEDE relies on translation of 
credentials between the campus domain, 
InCommon, and the XSEDE single sign-on 
system. 
Figure 1 - The InCommon Federation defines standard 
behavior, attributes, and protocols. The 
campus identity provider converts the 
user's campus identity into standard 
SAML format for access to web services. 
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It is important to note that the account linking process does not replace the XSEDE allocations process. 
Rather, the account linking process relies on the allocations process for identity vetting and authorization 
of XSEDE users. The federated login capability provides only a new authentication method for vetted 
XSEDE researchers. 
 
XSEDE users may link identities from multiple identity providers to their XSEDE account, allowing 
researchers associated with multiple research institutions to log in to XSEDE using whichever identity 
provider is convenient at the time. However, to avoid account sharing (which is a violation of XSEDE 
policy), researchers may link at most one identity from each identity provider with their XSEDE account. 
For example, a professor may not link his or her graduate students’ campus identities with his or her 
XSEDE account. Instead, the XSEDE policy requires each professor, graduate student, etc., to obtain their 
own individual XSEDE account. After login, XSEDE users may view and delete their account links. 
A.2 InCommon: Credential Translation 
The account linking process facilitates a browser-based, federated login to XSEDE systems. However, a 
significant proportion of XSEDE use cases and workloads are command-line, complex-workflow, and/or 
unattended/batch processes, which are not well supported by browser-based authentication (i.e., SAML 
Web Browser Single Sign-On). So, the XSEDE federated login employs credential translation to convert 
the browser-based credential to a credential that supports these use cases. 
Specifically, the XSEDE federated login converts the authentication assertion, provided by an 
InCommon-member identity provider, to an X.509 certificate, provided by a certificate authority (CA) 
trusted by XSEDE. XSEDE has a significant investment in a certificate-based single sign-on 
infrastructure. Support for certificate-based authentication in remote login (GSISSH), job submission 
(GRAM), and file transfer (GridFTP) protocols enables today’s interactive XSEDE use cases. 
Furthermore, proxy certificate delegation [3] enables complex, multi-tier workflows and batch processing 
in XSEDE. 
 
Through XSEDE’s federated login capability, XSEDE researchers can use their campus login to obtain 
certificates for web and desktop applications. After federated login, the XSEDE web site presents a menu 
of options. Researchers can launch remote login and file transfer applets in their browser, authenticating 
with a certificate loaded into their browser session. Additionally, researchers can launch an application 
that delivers a certificate to the local filesystem, ready to be used with XSEDE compatible desktop 
applications. 
 
In summary, the researcher’s federated login to XSEDE requires multiple credential translation steps. 
First, the local campus identity provider translates a local campus credential (such as a Kerberos 
username and password) to a SAML authentication assertion as specified by InCommon. Then, XSEDE’s 
federated login system translates the SAML assertion to an X.509 certificate. Finally, XSEDE service 
providers translate the certificate to a local resource login (i.e., a Unix account). 
J. Science Gateways 
To support users who do not have their own XSEDE accounts, science gateways use “community 
credentials” (X.509 certificates that identify the gateway) to access “community accounts” on XSEDE 
resources [5][6]. To support per-user accounting in this mode, science gateways create a unique X.509 
proxy certificate for each user, generated from their original X.509 community credential. The gateways 
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add a non-critical extension to the certificate
9
 that contains information about the user in a SAML 
assertion, which is subsequently extracted on the compute resource. This method was chosen because the 
X.509 proxy certificate is conveyed in existing GRAM and GSI-enable SSH protocols without having to 
modify them. 
A.3 MyProxy OAuth 
For science gateway users who have their own XSEDE accounts, it is preferable to use their individual 
XSEDE account with the gateway, rather than the gateway’s community account, for more accurate 
accounting and broader access to XSEDE resources. The XSEDE MyProxy OAuth Service
10
 [4] supports 
this use case while avoiding disclosure of the user’s XSEDE password to the science gateway. When the 
science gateway requires a certificate to act on a user’s behalf, it redirects the user’s browser to the 
XSEDE User Portal (XUP), where the user authenticates (as with a regular XUP session) and approves or 
denies use of his or her XSEDE credentials by the science gateway. If the user successfully authenticates 
and approves the use, the XUP obtains a certificate from the XSEDE MyProxy server, then redirects the 
user’s browser back to the science gateway with a one-time-use OAuth token that the gateway uses to get 
the certificate from the XSEDE MyProxy OAuth Service, so the gateway can access XSEDE resources on 
the user’s behalf. The service implements the OAuth 1.0a protocol as specified in RFC 5849 [7]. 
 
To ensure credentials are provided only to approved gateways, the service requires gateways to register 
prior to using the service. Globus Online is the first use case of the XSEDE MyProxy OAuth Service. 
When Globus Online users connect to XSEDE endpoints, they are first redirected to the XSEDE OAuth 
Service to login using their XSEDE username and password, thereby retrieving a credential for 
subsequent authentication to XSEDE endpoints. 
 
The XSEDE MyProxy OAuth Service today supports only the specific use case of delivering certificates 
to science gateways and does not provide a general-purpose web single sign-on service for XSEDE web 
applications. 
K. Authentication to Service Providers 
Each XSEDE service provider supports a combination of the following authentication methods: 
certificates, SSH key pairs, site-local passwords, and one-time password tokens. Of these methods, 
certificates are the only authentication method supported consistently across all service providers. Each 
service provider maintains a local mapping between accounts and certificate DNs, updated via the AMIE 
protocol. Remote login (GSISSH), job submission (GRAM), and file transfer (GridFTP) services consult 
this local mapping, found in /etc/grid-security/grid-mapfile, and use it to determine the target Unix 
account corresponding to the certificated used for authentication. The services then execute requested 
actions (i.e., open a login shell, submit a batch job, or access files) inside the target account (i.e., by 
performing a setuid call). 
L. Authorization 
Authorization at XSEDE service providers is based on site-local Unix accounts. Upon receiving an AMIE 
packet indicating a new user allocation, the service provider will create a local Unix account for that user, 
                                                     
9
 http://teragridforum.org/mediawiki/index.php?title=Science_Gateway_Credential_with_Attributes 
10
 http://security.ncsa.illinois.edu/teragrid-oauth/ 
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if one doesn’t already exist. When the user’s allocations expire, the service provider will disable the local 
Unix account, subject to a site-defined grace period.  
M. Delegation 
XSEDE supports delegation via RFC 3820 proxy certificates. When a user logs in via GSISSH, the SSH 
protocol delegates a proxy certificate along with the user’s session so the user can easily GSISSH to 
another system, access files using GridFTP or GSISCP, or submit jobs via GRAM, without requiring the 
user to sign on again (i.e., without requiring the user to enter another password). When a user submits a 
job via GRAM, the GRAM protocol delegates a proxy certificate along with the job so it can access files 
using GridFTP or GSISCP. In this way, delegation provides single sign-on to XSEDE users. 
N. Conclusion 
Since the TeraGrid program began in 2001, the community has developed a rich set of technical security 
mechanisms to enable interoperability between service providers both in the United States and 
internationally, leveraging International Grid Trust Federation, Open Grid Forum, and X.509 standards. 
Recent adoption of SAML and OAuth provides improved security support for browser-based use cases. 
This document will be updated as the XSEDE technical security mechanisms continue to evolve. 
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